Automated planning, the problem of how an agent achieves a goal given a repertoire of actions, is one of the foundational and most widely studied problems in the AI literature. The original formulation of the problem makes strong assumptions regarding the agent's knowledge and control over the world, namely that its information is complete and correct, and that the results of its actions are deterministic and known.
Introduction
The planning problem is one of the oldest and most studied problems in the AI research literature; a vast body of work has been devoted to establishing theoretical results (the worst-case time complexity of various problem classes), nding representations and algorithms that e ectively solve important classes of problems, and evaluating those representations and algorithms empirically.
Until recently planning was almost exclusively posed as a problem of logical deduction: given an initial state of the world, actions that e ect state changes, and a set of states identi ed as goal states, nd a sequence of actions that (provably) leave the world in (any) one of goal states provided that it begins in the initial state.
Strong assumptions implicitly underly this model: the initial state is known, the exact e ects of each action is known, and there are no unknown exogenous changes in state. As a result, the agent is omniscient in its world (at least with respect to all variables relevant to achieving its goal), and nding a solution plan amounts to constructing a deduction that executing the plan in the known initial state would leave the world in a known goal state.
An interesting side e ect of this model is that observing the world state dur-ing plan execution is unnecessary: no model of sensing the world is required because the agent always knows ahead of time what state the world will be in as it executes its plan. The agent's awless ability to predict compensates for its inability to sense the world (and thus to make action decisions at run time).
There are obvious limitations to this problem de nition as a model of human or machine agency: rarely can the world be so completely known or so thoroughly controlled.
To address these limitations, various alternative models have been introduced. One line of inquiry extends the classical logical model to admit incomplete information about the world state, extending the planning paradigm to include observation actions and contingency plans. These models represent incomplete information by modeling the agent's state of information as a set of states (the true world state must be one of the states in this set). These models allow reasoning about incomplete information about the world's initial state, but generally do not address issues associated with uncertainty about action e ects or about exogenous change in the world (e.g. e ected by other agents).
Taking this approach a step further, one can adopt a probabilistic semantics: the agent's state of information becoming a distribution over world states and the actions becoming stochastic state transitions. The Buridan work 16] presents this model under the classical planning assumption that the agent is unable to observe the world's state during plan execution; C- Buridan 11] extends the work to allow a plan to contain stochastic sensing actions.
A third line of work (see 5] for a survey) discards the classical planning model altogether and studies control models|in particular Markov Decision Processes|as an alternative way to think about planning scenarios. In doing so the logical semantics, omniscience assumptions, and strict goal orientation of classical planning are replaced by a probabilistic semantics and an alternative set of assumptions. Most notable among these is the assumption of full observability taken from the most common MDP models (FOMDPs): although uncertainty prevents the agent from predicting the run-time state ahead of time, it has complete and accurate information about that state at execution time 1 .
There has been extensive analysis of the computational complexity of classical (deterministic) planning problems, e.g. 7] , and likewise the complexity of common MDP problems is well understood: fully observable MDPs are analyzed by Papadimitriou Probabilistic classical planning is not covered by either of these lines of analysis due to its probabilistic semantics and to the fact that goal-pursuit planning cannot be reduced to a problem of planning over a xed nite horizon. That is, the length of a solution plan cannot in general be bounded a priori.
This paper begins with a complexity analysis of this probabilistic planning problem. Given: a set of states a probability distribution over the identity of the initial state a set of goal states a set of operators that e ect stochastic state transitions a rational threshold on the probability of plan success determine whether there is a sequence of operators that will leave the system in a goal state with probability at least . The paper's main result proves the undecidability of this problem, using an existing result establishing the undecidability of an isomorphic problem in the area of Probabilistic Finite-State Automata (PFAs).
The result applies more widely, however, to a variety of problems in stochastic planning and control. For example, the result can be extended to resolve an open problem posed in 25] regarding the undecidability of in nite-horizon POMDPs and a conjecture by Paz about the undecidability of a related PFA problem. Figure 1 shows the problems analyzed in this paper. In the gure, the problems in bold rectangles are those established as undecidable in this paper. The oval is the existing result, and the rounded rectangles represent problems with well-studied complexity results discussed to put our results in contexts. Arrows point from \easier" to \harder" problems. The paper begins with the existing result regarding the undecidability of determining whether the set of input strings accepted by a PFA is empty. It then shows that an isomorphic probabilistic planning problem is undecidable, and so too are more general classes of \unobservable" and partially observable MDP problems. This result applies both to optimization and approximation versions of the problems, and to discounted and undiscounted objective functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de nes the relevant stochastic optimization problems: fully and partially observable MDPs, probabilistic planning, and PFAs. Section 3 begins by explaining the undecidability proof for the PFA emptiness problem, extends the result to the PFA threshold-isolation problem, then establishes the undecidability of the probabilistic planning problem. Section 4 then extends the result to various POMDP problems: discounted and undiscounted objective functions, related approximation problems, and questions of existence of optimal policies with special structure. Section 5 presents related work and conclusions.
Problem De nitions
We make the standard assumption that the input parameters in all problems are rational numbers. We will be using matrices and vectors at several points, but only familiarity with elementary linear algebra is needed. the number of symbols in w, and pre(w; i) denotes the length i pre x of w, thus pre(w; i) = 1 2 i . denotes the set of all nite sequences (strings) of elements in ; including the empty string.
Probabilistic Planning
This work was originally motivated by questions about the computability of probabilistic planning problems, such as the problems introduced in 16, 5] .
The probabilistic planning problem, studied by Kushmerick, Hanks, and Weld 16] for example, consists of a nite set of states (or equivalently, an assignment of truth values to a nite number of Boolean variables) a nite set of actions e ecting stochastic state transitions a start state (or probability distribution over states) a goal region of the state space (a subset of states designated as goal) a threshold on the probability of success.
The problem is to nd any sequence of actions that would move the system from the start state to a goal state with probability exceeding . While this abstract form of the problem, described in terms of system states and transition among the states, may seem dissimilar to what often appears in the literature on probabilistic planning in AI, most other variations can be seen to be at least as hard in terms of worst case computational complexity. When viewed from the point of the underlying states, the probabilistic planning problem, as just described, can be thought as a special Markov decision process problem.
Markov Decision Processes
A Markov decision process (MDP) model consists of a set Q of n states, and a nite set of actions, . Time is discretized and at each time point t, t = 0; 1; ; the system occupies a single state in Q, which is called the (current) state of the system at time t. The means of change in system state is action execution, and there is uncertainty about the outcome of actions.
Consider the states indexed: s i 2 Q; 1 i n. Associated with each action a 2 is an n n stochastic matrix M a which speci es the state transition probabilities for action a. M a i; j] has the semantics that if the state of the system is s i at a given time point t and action a is executed, with probability M a i; j] the state of the system at time point t + 1 is s j . We refer to M a as the transition matrix or the dynamics (matrix) of action a. Also associated with each action a is an n 1 vector of rewards R a , with the semantics that the decision maker gains R a i] (or incurs cost R a i] when R a i] < 0), if the state of the system is s i and action a is executed. MDP models satisfy the Markov property: the next state of the system, and other aspects such as the reward attained and the observation made (see below), depend only on the current state of the system and the action executed, and not, for example, on the history of previous system states and executed actions.
The states and actions (basically the transition matrices and the reward vectors) are completely speci ed as part of the problem instance. Informally, the problem of a decision maker, confronted with such a system, is to execute actions that maximize some measure of accumulated reward{for example, the expected total reward{over some xed number of time steps or over an indenite number of time steps. Observe that in making a choice of action, not only the immediate reward of an action is important, but also the state the action leads to may be signi cant in obtaining a high reward in the future.
The reader is referred to books on MDPs and POMDPs, such as Puterman 27], White 33] , and Bertsekas 4] , for a more comprehensive introduction to the models and motivational examples. We will next describe two important aspects, state observability, and the time horizon and value functions, over which model speci cations vary, and de ne a few computational problems.
Observability
In the traditional fully observable MDP model, the system state at each time point is known to the decision maker at the time the next action is selected and executed. In the partially observable (POMDP) generalization, the decision maker may have only partial information about the system state, for example a probability distribution over possible states. Consequently, in the POMDP model, there are two sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about the outcome of actions and, at each time point, uncertainty over the current system state. In general, partial observability makes the life of the decision maker di cult, as the current system state may not be known, and, for example, the decision maker may need to act conservatively.
Generally in POMDPs, after each action execution, the decision maker obtains some feedback, possibly erroneous, on the current state of the system. In common POMDP models, a state s i emits an observation (signal) O j 2 O, where O is a nite observable set. The source of partial observability is the possibility that multiple states may emit the same observation. Traditionally, the observation is modeled as a random variable depending on the state or on both the state and the action executed. The distributions of the random variables are given as part of the problem instance. The fully observable MDP model corresponds to an extreme case where each state maps to a unique observable.
In this paper, we consider another extreme of partial observability, the unobservable MDP (UMDP) model, where all states map to the same observation. The UMDP model simpli es our analyses of computability and is closely related to the probabilistic nite automaton model de ned in Section 2.3. Of course, the hardness results that we establish apply to the more general POMDP variations as well. Note also that the probabilistic planning problem as described in Section 2.1 can also be viewed as a UMDP with a special value function (see Section 2.2.4).
We always assume that the decision maker is given a probability distribution over the initial state. For the undecidability results, the decision maker may even know the initial state. Let a state probability distribution at time t be denoted by the 1 n vector x (t) ; x (t) i] is the probability that the system is in state s i . Given probability distribution x (t) at time t, and execution of action a at time t, the probability distribution at time t + 1 is x (t+1) = x (t) M a . Thus by knowing current probability distribution and action, the next probability distribution is easily computed. Therefore in UMDPs, the distribution x (t) , computed from the initial probability distribution x (0) and the sequence of actions executed till time t, is the only information available to the decision maker about the system's state at time t.
In nite-Horizon Criteria
In this paper, we will be interested in in nite-horizon optimization objectives or criteria, that is, we assume the decision maker executes actions in the system over an inde nite or an unbounded number of time steps, and in case of UMDPs we will consider both nite and in nite sequences of actions. This contrasts with nite-horizon objectives, where the decision maker executes a xed and known number of actions. The complexity of nite horizon MDPs and POMDPs has been extensively studied; see for example 25, 17, 22, 23] .
Measures of Value of Action Sequences
In solving planning and MDPs problems, we need a measure of value of an action sequence to formulate optimization objectives and computational problems. We will sometimes refer to a choice of value measure as an optimality criterion. Once a value measure is de ned, an optimization objective becomes selecting the action sequence with the highest value in the collection of possible action sequences. We will now discuss several value measures for action sequences and introduce notation for expressing them.
Most MDP models adopt an additive value model in which the overall value of executing a policy is expressed as a function on the sum of the rewards collected at each stage. In this model, execution of an action a, given a distribution x over system state, gives an expected reward of P 1 i n x i]R a i]; which can be expressed compactly using vector product notation as xR a .
Let w denote a nonempty, nite or in nite, sequence of actions. By execution of the sequence w we mean that the ith action, w i ; is executed at time t = i ? 1; i 1, so w 1 is executed at time 0, w 2 at time 1, and so on. Let us rst express the total reward value of w, which is the total expected reward obtained when initial system distribution is x (0) and w is executed. Let R w i and M w i denote the reward vector and the dynamics matrix of the ith action in w respectively. Then x (i?1) R w i is the expected reward from executing the ith action w i at time t = i ? 1. Note that x (i) is determined by w and x (0) :
We use the function V to denote the expected reward of w when initial distribution is x (0) : We have:
x (i?1) R w i ; (1) where if jwj = 1, it is understood that the limit is taken, if well de ned. This expected total reward measure is called the total reward criterion.
A common and well-studied variation on the optimality criterion, called the total discounted reward value, or the discounted criterion for short, is always well de ned in the presence of arbitrary reward and state transition structure. Under this criterion, a discount factor , 0 < 1, is used to discount future rewards. The value of a sequence w, at an initial distribution x (0) is then expressed as:
The average reward criterion is another natural and common measure. The (expected) average reward of a nite action sequence, is its expected total reward divided by its length. The average reward of an in nite sequence w is the limit of the average rewards of its nite pre xes as the pre x length grows:
where V(pre(w; i); x (0) ) denotes the total reward of length i pre x of w, as de ned above. There may be no such limit for some in nite action sequences.
Goal Oriented Optimality Criteria
An important special case of the total-reward criterion is when a reward is obtained at most once upon entering a specially designated \goal" state. We call this special criterion the goal-oriented model or criterion. This criterion is always well de ned and is basically equivalent to the criterion of maximizing the probability of reaching the goal state. The probabilistic planning problem falls under this criterion and all our undecidability results are based on reductions from goal-oriented problems.
Policies and Computational Problems
Under any optimality criterion a number of computational problems of interest suggest themselves. We formulate several such problems under the in nitehorizon discounted criterion. A discounted UMDP model is speci ed by the sextuple M = fQ; ; fM a g; fR a g; x 0 ; g, where Q and are the states and actions of the model, fM a g and fR a g are the sets of transition dynamics and rewards corresponding to the actions, x 0 is the initial distribution, and is the discount factor. A simple decision problem, which we call the sequence existence problem is then: Problem 2.1 Given a discounted UMDP M, and a threshold , is there a nite action sequence w, such that V (w; x (0) ) > ?
This sequence existence problem is a major problem shown undecidable in Section 4. Similar problems can be speci ed under other criteria (see Problem 4.1).
Let us next de ne optimal values and optimal action sequences under the discounted model. Let X be the set of n 1 vectors of probability distribution over system state: X = fxjx i] 0; P n i=1 x i] = 1g. Let the optimal value function V : X ! R; be de ned as:
The function V is well de ned over any x 2 X, since V (x) is bounded from above and below at any x: the execution of any action at any time point falls in ?R; +R], where R denotes the highest reward in absolute value over components of action reward vectors, thus for any w, its value V (w; x)
is bounded above and below by R P 1 i=0
. Put in words, V (x) is the highest value in expectation attainable if the initial distribution is x. An optimization problem is then: given a UMDP and an initial distribution x (0) ; compute V (x (0) ) or an approximate thereof.
It is also the case that there is some action sequence w, which we call an optimal action sequence, that yields the value V (x) (possibly in the limit if in nite) when executed with the initial distribution being x. An action sequence for a UMDP is an example of a policy. A policy, in general, is a prescription of action as a function of the information available to the decision maker. In the UMDP case, we may think of action sequences as policies that specify the action to take as a function of the time point only. An optimization problem would then be: given a UMDP and an initial distribution x (0) ; compute a nite representation of an optimal action sequence, or compute a nite pre x, for example the rst action of the sequence.
A representation of a policy which is an elegant way of controlling a POMDP is a nite controller. Brie y, a nite controller for controlling a given POMDP is a nite state machine which prescribes an action to execute at each of its own states, and when the prescribed action is executed and an observation from the POMDP is observed, it changes state based on the observation and its current state. Algorithms generating nite controllers show promise in fast nding optimal or near optimal policies in many POMDP problems 15]. In case of UMDPs, because there is no observation, the output of a nite controller is just a periodic action sequence. Formally we de ne a periodic action sequence as follows: given an alphabet (action set) , we call a sequence w periodic if w = uv 1 , where u; v 2 (note that a string|a nite sequence|is periodic under this de nition). Not all POMDP problems have optimal nite controllers: a simple two-state 2-armed bandit counter-example can be constructed and see 20] for a 3-state UMDP counter-example. In the next section, we will view action sequences as the desired output for solving UMDPs, but the problem of whether an optimal nite controller exists is also addressed in Section 4.6.
Throughout this paper we always assume that a UMDP problem includes the initial distribution over states in the problem speci cation.
Probabilistic Finite Automata
A probabilistic nite-state automaton (PFA) M is de ned by a quintuple M = (Q; ; T; s 1 ; s n ) where Q is a set of n states, is the input alphabet, T is a set of n n row-stochastic transition matrices, one for each symbol in , s 1 2 Q is the initial state of the PFA, and s n 2 Q is an accepting state.
The PFA model shares the dynamics of the UMDP model: a PFA occupies one state from its states Q at any point in time, and at each stage transitions stochastically from one state to another. The state transition is determined as follows:
(1) The current input symbol a determines a transition matrix M a .
(2) The current state s i determines the row M a i; :], a probability distribution over the possible next states.
(3) The state changes according to the probability distribution M a i; :].
In the undecidability proof, we restrict attention to PFA in which the accepting state s n is absorbing: M a n; n] = 1:0; 8a 2 : This is equivalent to the assumption of the automaton halting upon entering the accepting state s n .
We say a PFA M accepts the string w 2 if the automaton ends in the accepting state upon reading the string w; otherwise we say it rejects the string. We denote by p M (w) the acceptance probability of string w by PFA M. Note that for any in nite sequence w, the acceptance probabilities of the pre xes p M (pre(w; i)) do not decrease with i as the accepting state is assumed to be absorbing, and consequently the limit lim i!1 p M (pre(w; i)) is well de ned, and is de ned naturally to be the acceptance probability p M (w) of w.
The language accepted by a PFA M given a threshold , denoted by L(M; ), is the set of all strings that take the PFA to the accepting state with probability greater than : L(M; ) = fw 2 : p M (w) > g:
An important problem, which we call the emptiness problem, is whether, given a PFA M and threshold , the language accepted by M is empty.
While PFA are models of language acceptors and probabilistic planning and UMDP problems are stochastic optimization problems, note that the underlying system models are the same with the alphabet corresponding to the actions and acceptance corresponding to goal achievement. This change in view allows us to see the connection between PFA models and probabilistic planning and UMDPs and leads to the undecidability results.
Undecidability Results for Probabilistic Planning Problems
Now that we have described the models, we show that many problems of interest are undecidable by showing reductions from the emptiness problem.
Undecidability of the Emptiness Problem
The (language) emptiness problem for PFAs is as follows: Problem 3.1 Given a PFA and a desired threshold , decide whether or not there is some input string w 2 that the PFA accepts with probability exceeding threshold .
Both Paz 26] and Lipton and Condon 9] establish the undecidability of the problem: Theorem 3.2 26] 9] The emptiness problem for PFAs is undecidable.
Below, we describe the properties of the reduction in 9] from a high level, and then give a more detailed explanation of the proof. The details of the proof are also used to develop subsequent undecidability results on probabilistic planning and POMDP problems, most notably Theorem 4.4, which establishes the undecidability of optimal policy construction for discounted-total-reward in nite-horizon POMDPs.
Properties of the Reduction
In 9], the (undecidable) question of whether a Turing machine (TM) accepts the empty string is reduced to the question of whether a PFA accepts any string with probability exceeding a given threshold. The PFA constructed by the reduction tests whether its input is a concatenation of accepting sequences. An accepting sequence is a legal sequence of TM con gurations beginning at the initial con guration and terminating in an accepting con guration.
The reduction has the property that if the TM is accepting, i.e. it accepts the empty string, then the PFA accepts su ciently long concatenations of accepting sequences with high probability. But if the TM is not accepting, the PFA accepts all strings with low probability. We next formalize these properties and use them in subsequent undecidability results. The following section explains how the PFA generated by the reduction has these properties. We conclude this section making two additional points about the emptiness problem.
Due to the separation between the acceptance probability of the PFA in the two cases of the TM accepting the empty string or otherwise, the emptiness problem remains undecidable if the strict inequality in the description of the existence problem is replaced by a weak equality ( ) relation. Although the problem is posed in terms of the existence of ( nite) strings, the result holds even if the sequences have in nite length.
Details of the Reduction
The class of TMs used in the reduction in 9] are two-counter TMs, which are as powerful as general TMs. The constructed PFA is supposed to detect whether a sequence of computations represents a valid accepting computation (accepting sequence) of the TM. This task reduces to the problem of checking the legality of each transition from one con guration of the TM to the next, which amounts to verifying that the rst con guration has the machine in the start state the last con guration has the machine in the accepting state each transition is legal according to the TM's transition rules.
All these checks can be carried out by a deterministic nite state automaton, except the check as to whether the TM's counter contents remain valid across consecutive con gurations. The PFA rejects immediately if any of the easily veri able transition rules are violated, which leaves only the problem of validating the counters' contents across each transition.
On each computation step taken by a two-counter TM the counters' contents either stay the same, get incremented by 1, or get decremented by 1. Assuming without loss of generality that the counter contents are represented in unary, this problem reduces to checking whether two strings have the same length:
given a string a i b j , does i = j?
Although this question cannot be answered exactly by any PFA, a weak equality test developed in 9] and inspired by the work of Freivalds 13] can answer it in a strict and limited sense which is nonetheless su cient to allow the reduction. The weak equality test, shown in Fig. 2 , works as follows. The PFA scans its input string a i b j , and with high probability enters an Indecision state (equivalently we say the outcome of the test is Indecision). In the gure, the event of Indecision is given a thick edge to denote its high probability. With some low probability the PFA enters one of two \decisive" states. If the substrings have equal length (Fig. 2a) the PFA either enters a Correct state or a Suspect state. It enters these two states equiprobably. However, suppose that Concatenate to raise acceptance probability. w Fig. 3. (a) When the TM is accepting, on an accepting sequence w, while the probability of making an all decisive decision is minute, the PFA will accept or reject with equal probability. By concatenating w, the acceptance probability can be raised to as close to 1=2 as desired. (b) When the TM is not accepting, on a false accepting sequence w, if the PFA makes a decision, with very high probability it is rejection.
the PFA enters a decisive state but the input string is composed of unequallength substrings (i 6 = j, Fig. 2b ). In this case the Suspect outcome is at least 2 k (for k 2) times more likely than the Correct outcome, where the discrimination factor k can be made as large as desired by increasing the size of the PFA. This test is described in more detail in Appendix A.
The PFA of the reduction carries out a global test of its own, not unlike the weak equality test (Fig. 3) , on a candidate accepting sequence for the TM, and uses the weak equality test to check for counter increments or decrements on consecutive con gurations. Given a candidate accepting sequence, if the outcome of all the tests are decisive and correct, the PFA accepts the input. If the outcome of all the tests are suspect, the PFA rejects the input. The probability of an all decisive test is, of course, very small, but positive. The PFA remains in the global-indecision state until it detects the start of the next candidate accepting sequence (start con guration of the TM), or until it reaches the end of the input. It follows from the outcome of the individual tests that, if the PFA is given an illegal candidate accepting sequence, where the counter contents are not changed legally, given that the outcome of all test are decisive, the PFA rejects with much higher probability than it accepts (Fig. 3b) . If the PFA is in the global-indecision state at the end of the input, it rejects.
If the original TM accepts the empty string, observe that the probability that the PFA accepts can approach the upper limit 1=2 on an input string consisting of a concatenation of su ciently many accepting sequences (Fig.  3a) . If the TM does not accept the empty string, it follows from the properties of the weak equality test that the probability that the PFA rejects is at least 2 k times more likely than the probability that it accepts. We can increase the acceptance probability of the PFA when the TM is accepting by adding a nite counter to the PFA, as discussed next.
Increasing the PFA Acceptance Probability
By making a minor adjustment to the PFA, the acceptance probability of the PFA when the TM accepts the empty string can be made arbitrarily close to 1: instead of rejecting or accepting if it sees an all suspect or an all correct outcome on a single candidate accepting sequence, the PFA can instead increment an all-decisive counter which has a nite upper limit K. The PFA accepts its input if and only if the all-decisive counter reaches K, and it has seen an all correct on a candidate sequence. Hence, if the TM is accepting, the PFA accepts concatenation of su ciently many accepting sequences with probability arbitrarily close to 1 ? (1=2) K . In addition, for the cases when the TM is not accepting, the acceptance probability of the PFA can be made as small as desired for a given counter upper limit K, by choosing the discrimination factor k of the weak equality test to be large.
Undecidability of Approximations
The question of approximability is an important one, especially when computing an optimal answer is impossible. Unfortunately, it follows from the next corollary that approximations, such as computing a string which the PFA accepts with probability within an additive constant or multiplicative factor < 1 of the maximum acceptance probability of the PFA 2 are also uncomputable.
Corollary 3.4 For any xed ; 0 < < 1, the following problem is undecidable: Given is a PFA M for which one of the two cases hold:
The PFA accepts some string with probability greater than 1 ? .
The PFA accepts no string with probability greater than .
Decide whether case 1 holds.
Proof. The corollary is an immediate consequence of the properties outlined in Theorem 3.3, and the fact that in the reduction can be made as small as desired. This needs more explanation. Omid: I added one more sentence! 2
Undecidability of the Threshold-Isolation Problem
There might be some hope for decidability of the emptiness problem for special cases, for example for problems for which the given threshold is isolated for the given PFA:
De nition 1 28] Let M be a PFA. The threshold is -isolated with respect to M if jp M (x) ? j for all x 2 , for some > 0. Problem 3.5 The threshold-isolation problem 3 is, given a PFA M and a threshold , decide whether, for some > 0; the threshold is -isolated for the PFA M.
Isolated thresholds are interesting because PFAs with isolated thresholds have less expressive power than general PFAs, thus the corresponding decision problems are easier. General PFAs are powerful enough to accept even non-contextfree languages 26]. However, Rabin 28] showed that PFA with isolated thresholds accept regular languages. A natural question then is: given a PFA and a threshold, whether the threshold is isolated for the PFA. If we can compute the answer and it is positive, then we can presumably compute the regular language accepted by the PFA, and see whether it is empty or not. That would a ord at least the opportunity to recognize and solve a special case of the general emptiness problem.
The decidability of the isolation problem was raised by Paz 26] , and was heretofore an open question to the best of our knowledge. The reduction in 9] shows that recognizing an isolated threshold is hard as well:
Corollary 3.6 The threshold-isolation problem is undecidable.
Proof. As stated in Theorem 3.3, we can design the reduction with = 1=3;
and K = 1. It follows that if the TM is not accepting, then there is no string that the PFA accepts with probability greater than 1=3, while if the TM is accepting, there are ( nite) strings that the PFA accepts with probability arbitrarily close to 1=2. In other words, the threshold 1=2 is isolated i the TM is not accepting.
3.Undecidable Problems in Probabilistic Planning
The results of the previous section establish the uncomputability of probabilistic planing problems in the general case|when there is no restriction imposed on the length of solution plans considered. Uncomputability follows when it is established that a su ciently powerful probabilistic planning language can model any given PFA, so that any question about a PFA can be reformulated as a probabilistic planning problem.
This is the case for the probabilistic planning model investigated in Kushmerick, Hanks, and Weld 16] . This model is based on STRIPS propositional planning 12] with uncertainty in the form of (conditional) probability distributions added to the action e ects. It is established by Boutilier, Dean, and Hanks 5] that the propositional encoding of states is su cient to represent any nite state space, and the extended probabilistic STRIPS action representation is su cient to represent any stochastic transition matrix. Thus the emptiness problem (\is there any input string that moves the automaton from the start state to an accepting state with probability at least ?") can be directly reformulated in the planning context (\is there any sequence of actions that moves the system from a start state to a goal state with probability at least ?"). An algorithm that solved the planning problem would answer the question of whether or not such a plan exists by either generating the plan or terminating having failed to do so, thus solving the equivalent emptiness problem. Therefore, as a corollary of the undecidability of the emptiness problem for PFAs we obtain:
Theorem 3.7 The plan-existence problem is undecidable.
We also note that due to the tight correspondence between PFAs and probabilistic planning problems, the other undecidability results from the previous section apply as well:
\Approximately satis cing planning," generating a plan that is within some additive or multiplicative factor of the threshold is undecidable. Deciding whether the threshold for a particular planning problem represents an isolated threshold for that problem is undecidable.
Undecidability Results for POMDP Problems
We noted earlier both that the probabilistic planning assumption of no observability was a restricted case of a probabilistic partial-observation model, and that the \goal pursuit" planning objective was a restricted case of more general objective functions.
It is therefore easy to establish that the strictly more general POMDP optimization problem (maximizing an arbitrary objective function over an in nite horizon) is undecidable. In this section we analyze some commonly studied restrictions to the objective function: positive bounded models, average-reward models, and discounted models, and show the corresponding optimization problems to be undecidable as well.
We rst de ne the policy-existence (action sequence existence) problem for POMDPs, under any given optimality criterion. This is a generic version of Problem 2.1 which was formulated for the discounted criterion. The space of policies considered in the following de nitions is an important consideration. All of the results hold when the space of policies includes any one or more of the following sets: nite action sequences of inde nite length, in nite sequences, or algorithms that create such nite or in nite sequences (using some kind of implicit policy representation).
Problem 4.1 The policy-existence problem (with respect to an optimality criterion) is: given a POMDP and a threshold, does there exist a policy with expected value greater than the threshold?
Undecidability for Positive-Bounded Models under Total Undiscounted Reward
The most direct result involves a special case of in nite-horizon undiscounted total-reward models called the positive bounded models 27]. The essential feature of this model is that the reward structure and system dynamics for a problem must ensure that the total reward gathered is bounded both above and below, and is convergent (over action sequences) over an in nite horizon.
The PFA emptiness problem or the planning problem can easily be posed as a positive-bounded POMDP:
the same observation o is received regardless of the state and action (nonobservability) unit reward is gathered on the execution of any action on the goal state (Fig. 4b) the execution of any action at the goal state leads to an absorbing state: the system stays in that state and gathers no additional rewards (Fig. 4b ) all other states and actions incur no reward.
From this equivalence we can immediately establish the following:
Theorem 4.2 The policy-existence problem for positive-bounded problems under the in nite-horizon total reward criterion is undecidable.
Proof. We describe a reduction from the plan-existence problem. Since any planning problem can be posed as a positive-bounded POMDP, we can easily verify that an e ective algorithm for that problem could be used to solve the plan-existence problem, and by Corollary 3.7 such an algorithm cannot exist. To see this, note that a plan, say a nite sequence of actions, exists for the planning problem with probability of reaching the goal (success probability) exceeding if and only if a nite sequence of actions exist with value exceeding for the corresponding UMDP model (as outlined above and in Fig. 4b ): let p denote the success probability of a nite sequence of actions w in the planning problem. Then p is the expected total reward of action sequence a in the corresponding UMDP model. Conversely, if v is the value of a sequence w in the UMDP model, then v is the success probability of sequence w in the planning problem.
A similar equivalence holds for in nite action sequences.
4.Undecidability under the Average Reward Criterion
The indirect connection to PFAs allows extension of the previous result to all undiscounted total-reward models, and to average-reward models as well. Proof. The proof is complete once we observe that questions on the acceptance probability of strings for a given PFA can readily be turned to questions on the value of similar strings in a related UMDP model. This transformation is achieved by modeling the probability of reaching the accepting state f using rewards (Fig. 4c) . It can be veri ed that there is a string accepted by the PFA M with probability exceeding if and only if there is a string with average reward greater than for the corresponding UMDP model. To see this, assume for some string w, p M (w) > ; and denote by V(w) the average reward of w under the corresponding UMDP model. For any action a, the expected total reward of wa k , k 1 is at least p M (w)k (i.e. the probability of entering A similar equivalence holds for in nite sequences.
4.3 Undecidability of the Discounted Criterion
We turn now to the most commonly studied model: maximizing total expected discounted reward over an in nite horizon. Here, as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we make a small change in the PFA constructed in the emptiness reduction.
Theorem 4.4 The policy-existence problem under the in nite-horizon discounted criterion is undecidable.
Proof. Let us take the PFA constructed in the reduction of Section 3.1.2 and change it to a leaky (or "discounted") PFA as follows. Let d be any rational value such that 0 < d < 1. The leaky PFA, upon reading an input symbol, continues as the original PFA with probability 1 ? d. Otherwise, we say that it leaks, and in this case it makes a transition to either an absorbing rejection state or the absorbing accepting state, each with equal overall probability d=2.
The equal leak probabilities "balance" each other, so that as we show below, the original PFA accepts a string with probability greater than 1/2 if and only if its leaky version accepts a string with probability greater than 1/2.
It is also not hard to verify that maximizing the probability of reaching the accepting state in such a leaky PFA corresponds to maximizing the expected total discounted reward in a UMDP problem with discount = 1 ? d 2 ; and a reward structure as described in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and Fig. 4b .
We now show that if the TM is accepting (see Section 3.1.1), then the leaky PFA accepts some strings with probability greater than 1=2, while if the TM is not accepting, every nite string is accepted with probability less than 1=2.
Assume the TM is accepting, and let w be an accepting sequence of the TM.
We assume the original PFA constructed in the reduction accepts only after K 2 decisive outcomes (the all-decisive counter limit K is explained in Section 3.1.3).
Let q j denote the probability that the PFA "halts" (i.e., goes into one of the absorbing states) on reading w j . Let E j be the event that the PFA has not leaked on w j given that it has halted, so that it has made K decisions, and let Pr(E j ) denote its probability. Hence, given that the PFA halts on w j , the probability of acceptance is p j = (1?Pr(E j ))=2+Pr(E j )(1?1=2 K ), where the rst term corresponds to the probability that it has leaked and accepted, given that it has halted, and the second is the probability that it hasn't leaked and accepted, given that it has halted. Thus the overall probability of acceptance is p M (w j ) = q j p j . Now, for some > 0; 1 ? 1=2 K = 1=2 + , since K 2, thus p j = (1 ? Pr(E j ))=2 + Pr(E j )(1=2 + ) = 1=2 + Pr(E j ) :
Therefore we may argue that, as the probability q j of the leaky PFA halting approaches 1 with increasing j of w j , Pr(E j ) is bounded from below by a constant greater than 0, to show that the acceptance probability exceeds 1=2 for some j. We note that when j < K; Pr(E j ) = 0; but Pr(E K ) > 0; as there is some probability that the PFA makes K decisions on w K . We now argue that Pr(E K ) Pr(E j ) for j K. The event E j , for j K, is the union of the disjoint events E 0 K , halting but not leaking on rst K concatenation of w, and E j?K , the event of not halting on rst K, but halting and not leaking on the remaining j ? K concatenations of w. Consequently, Pr(E j ) = Pr(E 0 K ) + Pr(E K?j ) = Pr(E K ) + Pr(E K?j ) Pr(E K ); 8j K:
Assume the TM is not accepting. A candidate (accepting) sequence refers to a sequence of TM con gurations where the rst one is the initial TM conguration and the last is an accepting con guration. Any input string s can be viewed as a concatenation of j 0 candidate sequences appended with a possibly empty string u where none of the pre xes of u is a candidate sequence: s = w 1 w 2 w j u; j 0: If j < K, then probability of acceptance of the leaky PFA is qp=2, where q < 1 is the probability of halting on s and p is the probability of leaking given that the PFA halts. Here, p = 1 because there is no other possibility for halting, but q < 1. If j K, then probability of acceptance is q(p=2 + (1 ? p)(1=2 ? )), where q < 1 is the probability of halting on s and p < 1 is the probability of leaking given that the PFA halts.
Given that the PFA halts and does not leak, the probability of acceptance is strictly less than 1=2, as the PFA is keeping a counter, and the probability of K suspect outcomes is more than 1=2 (for appropriately small K > 1, such as K = 2).
A similar conversion to the one in the proof of Theorem 4.2 reduces the stringexistence problem for the leaky PFA to the question of policy-existence in a UMDP under the discounted criterion, thus completing the proof.
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The addition of the nite counter to the PFA in the reduction in 9], while unnecessary for the proof establishing the undecidability of emptiness, is crucial in making the above proof work. Without it, or when K = 1, the probability of PFA acceptance can not exceed 1=2 whether or not the TM is accepting. On the other hand, in nite sequences corresponding to valid but non-halting TM computations would approach 1/2 with our construction of the leaky PFA. Thus with K = 1, there would be no distinction between cases of TM accepting and many cases of TM not accepting.
Undecidability under a Negative Model
The optimality criteria studied to this point involve maximizing the expected bene ts of executing a policy. An alternative goal would be to choose a policy likely to avoid disaster. In these cases (state-oriented negative models, see for example 27]) the objective is to minimize the probability of entering one or more designated negative states over the in nite horizon. We use the reduction in the previous proof to establish the undecidability of this particular negative model; the technique should be applicable to other negative models as well. Proof. We reduce the string-existence question for the leaky PFA in reduction of Theorem 4.4 to this problem. Note that in the string-existence reduction for the leaky PFA, if the TM is accepting, there exist in nite (and therefore nite) sequences of symbols on which the probability of acceptance of the leaky PFA exceeds 1=2. If the TM is rejecting, the probability of acceptance of no in nite sequence is over 1=2 (an in nite sequences with acceptance equals 1=2 may exist.). Take the rejecting absorbing state of the leaky PFA to be the state to avoid and the (undecidable) question would be whether there is an in nite sequence that avoids the rejecting state with probability exceeding 1=2. 2
Inapproximability in POMDPs
It is not hard to argue that an inapproximability result similar to the one for PFAs also holds for POMDPs under the total undiscounted reward and the average reward criteria. However, under the discounted criterion, the optimal value is approximable to within any > 0; due to the presence of the discount factor.
Existence of Optimal Finite Controllers and Optimal Strings
The question of whether an optimal nite controller exists for a given POMDP is an interesting one. A similar case to the threshold-isolation can be made for motivating such a question: given a POMDP and an initial distribution, if we could determine whether it has an optimal nite controller, and if the answer is positive, then possibly nding the controller would be easier, as only the space of nite controllers needs to be searched.
Recall from Section 2.2.5 that nite controllers are periodic action sequences for UMDPs. A simple construction, using example UMDPs or POMDPs that provably do not have an optimal periodic action sequence or nite controller, shows that the problem is undecidable under undiscounted total or average reward criteria 20]. The constructions make use of the gap in acceptance probability of the PFA corresponding to the cases of whether or not the TM is accepting. However, showing such under the discounted criterion is more di cult as there is no positive lower-bound on the gap. Extensions of the proof of Theorem 4.4 do not seem to work either as we explain brie y. This explanation also motivates our proof of the undecidability which follows. In the proof of Theorem 4.4, when the TM is accepting, there exists an optimal periodic sequence for the constructed PFA. On the other hand, a nonempty subset of those TMs that are not accepting have aperiodic con guration sequences. However, it is not clear that for a TM with an aperiodic con guration sequence, the corresponding PFA's optimal action sequences (which have success probability 1=2) need necessarily correspond to the TM's aperiodic legal con guration sequence and consequently be aperiodic. Note that the PFA can only reject when the sequence is composed of false candidate accepting sequences. If a sequence never ends in an accepting or rejecting con guration, has a few miscounts and is otherwise legal and ends in a periodic sequence of con gurations, it may obtain the limiting acceptance probability of 1=2 under the leaky PFA and therefore be optimal. In the following proof, we circumvent this di culty by easing the condition under which the PFA accepts and rejects, so that when the corresponding TM does not halt and has an aperiodic con guration sequence, the optimal sequence for the PFA would provably be aperiodic. In the process, however, we give up the di erence in acceptance probability of the PFA in the cases of TM accepting and rejecting. Theorem 4.6 The problem of whether an optimal nite controller exists for a discounted POMDP is undecidable.
Proof. We construct a leaky PFA similar to the ones in the proof of the undecidability of the emptiness problem and Theorem 4.4 but with a modi cation to the conditions of acceptance and rejection. As a consequence of the modi cation, the maximum probability of acceptance of the PFA is 1=2 whether or not the corresponding TM is accepting.
Consider rst the PFA in the proof of the undecidability of the emptiness problem. The modi cation is in the way the automaton behaves in case of a Decisive outcome of the weak equality test on the counter contents: If the outcome is Suspect on any test, the PFA rejects immediately, and if the outcome is Correct (again on any test), it accepts immediately, and otherwise, in case of Indecision, it continues. If it reaches the con guration corresponding to the end TM con guration (whether accepting or rejecting), it reinitializes to check for the start con guration and continues. Other conditions remain the same. For example, the PFA rejects if any of the easy to check conditions while checking a TM transition fails, or if the PFA reaches the end of the input. The PFA does not keep a nite counter. Finally we make such a PFA leaky, just as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, to capture discounting.
We see that such a PFA tests only that individual transitions are legal, and acceptance probability is not a ected by whether the corresponding TM is accepting or not. Thus, if the corresponding TM halts, then the in nite concatenation of its accepting or rejecting con guration sequence is periodic, over which the PFA has acceptance probability 1=2 in the limit. Similarly, if the TM does not halt but repeats a con guration, the corresponding con guration sequence is periodic over which the leaky PFA achieves probability 1=2 in the limit. Finally, if the TM does not halt and does not repeat a con guration, the leaky PFA still has limiting acceptance probability 1=2 over the corresponding aperiodic con guration sequence. This aperiodic sequence is the only optimal sequence for the PFA, as the probability of acceptance of any other sequence is strictly less than 1=2: any illegal sequence would have an illegal transition over which it's more likely that the PFA rejects given than it makes a decision on that particular test.
It follows that the (two-counter) Turing machine halting problem reduces to the periodic sequence existence problem: if the leaky PFA has an optimal periodic sequence, we know that the TM either halts or eventually repeats the same sequence of con gurations forever. We can simulate the TM to determine which is the case in nite time. If the leaky PFA has no optimal periodic se-quence, we know that the TM does not halt (and never repeats a con guration either). Undecidability follows.
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We note that, as a consequence of Theorem 4.4 the seemingly easier problem of whether there exists a string ( nite sequence) that is optimal is also undecidable: we can add a single action to the start state of the leaky PFA of Theorem 4.4. This action leads to the accepting and rejecting states with equal 0:5 probability. Then the UMDP would have an optimal nite sequence if and only if the TM is not accepting. Consequently, we also see that the related problem of given a UMDP, an initial distribution and an action sequence, whether we can do better than the given action sequence (i.e., the UMDP has higher expected value) than what the action sequence would provide, is undecidable, even in the discounted case.
Summary and Related Work
The main technical result in this paper established the undecidability of a wide class of stochastic optimization problems: probabilistic extensions to the classical planning problem with no observability and with stochastic observability in nite-horizon POMDPs under a variety of optimization criteria, including discounted models, both for exact and approximate solutions the threshold-isolation problem for PFAs the existence of an optimal nite controller for discounted and undiscounted POMDPs.
It should hardly be surprising that the general problem| nding the optimal policy for a partially observable system with an arbitrary objective function| was intractable, if for no other reason than that it would be impossible to bound the optimal policy's expected reward. More surprising is that none of the usual ways to restrict and simplify the problem: positive-bounded models, average-reward models, discounted models, explicit state representation, settling for approximate solutions|make the problem easier to solve in the worst case.
Related work includes complexity analyses for: (deterministic) classical planning restricted variants of probabilistic planning fully observable MDPs restricted variants of POMDPs probabilistic nite-state automata Complexity results for deterministic planning have been available for many years, beginning with Chapman's 8] rst NP-hardness result for STRIPs planning, followed by additional analysis by Bylander 7] . These results are related to this paper only because of the historical connection through the planning problem: the earlier results rely on a combinatorial analysis quite di erent from the techniques used to establish the results in this paper.
Littman, Goldsmith, and Mundhenk 18] analyze the complexity of propositional probabilistic planning problems inspired by the same model of planning derived from the classical AI literature 16]. Their results are based on a restriction placed on solutions, however, in that they limit the analysis to plans that can be expressed in size polynomial in the size of the problem speci cation. As a result, their results parallel the results for nite-horizon POMDPs. Rintanen 29] analyzes the complexity of probabilistic planning problems under average reward criteria, and establishes undecidability results for the in nite-horizon criteria based on our results.
Early papers on POMDP problem formulations include those by Drake 10 Analysis of the complexity of solving POMDPs began with the work of Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis 25], in which they formally establish NP-hardness results for a variety of nite-horizon problems, but only conjecture as to the undecidability of the in nite-horizon case. The computational complexity of nite-horizon control problems has received considerable attention recently, see for example 32, 6, 24, 14] . For the in nite-horizon case, two questions, the complexity of goal-state reachability with either nonzero probability or probability one, which reduce to reachability computations and are decidable, had been studied by Alur et. al. 1] and Littman 17] .
It is now well established that optimal planning without full observability is prohibitively di cult both in theory and practice 25, 17, 22] . These results suggest that it may be more promising to explore alternative problem formulations, including restrictions on the system dynamics and the agent's sensing and e ecting powers that are useful for realistic problem domains yet are more amenable to exact or approximate solution algorithms. The discovery that interesting problems are computationally intractable in the worst case should neither be surprising nor discouraging to the AI researcher at this point.
A The Weak Equality Test
Here we describe the algorithm, carried out by a PFA, for the weak equality test in detail. To see that such an algorithm can be executed by a PFA, it is easier to think of the PFA model as the equivalent one-way TM machine model, where the machine has a read-only input tape and a nite memory, and can also ip a fair coin on each step and base its transition on the coin ip in addition to its input and its state. Given is the input a i b j , and the question is whether i = j. The outputs of the algorithm (the state the PFA ends in) are Indecision, Suspect or Correct as described in Chapter 3. The PFA performs the following independent computations as it scans the input:
(1) For each letter a, the algorithm ips two coins. Pr( AB or A B) : Similarly, the probability of Correct given Decision is Pr(BjA B or AB) = 
